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This article explores two unique aspects of the Chinese Tort Liability Law (TLL):1 (1) 
Article 24 holds that a party not at fault shall share the loss with the victim in non-strict 
liability cases under undefined circumstances, and (2) the government often shields a party 
at fault from liability in mass tort cases by disregarding the TLL entirely. These two aspects 
may seem contradictory; however, they are both based on the same principle of socialized 
liability, which is first articulated in this article.  
Scholars often claim that Article 24 embodies the principle of equitable liability. This 
article challenges such claims and asserts that Article 24 is, in fact, inequitable because it 
allows a party not at fault to be held liable. Article 24 defies the traditional notion that 
liability should not only be based on fault, but also proportional to fault. Thus, it failed to 
provide a clear standard of care that individuals and entities can follow to avoid liability.  
This article argues that the principle of socialized liability is helpful in discerning the 
essence of Article 24 and other related provisions in the TLL. The new principle explains 
why Chinese lawmakers and courts are willing to deviate from fault-based liability, the 
bedrock of Western tort law. Through the lens of socialized liability, this article analyzes 
leading tort cases that have invoked Article 24 and related provisions, as well as several 
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1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Ze Ren FA (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort 
Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China] [hereinafter “TLL”] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-
12/26/content_1497435.htm.  
 







incidents where the government has deliberately disregarded the TLL. This analysis reveals 
that the socialized liability principle aligns well with the broader goals the Chinese 
government intends to achieve, in particular, maintenance of social stability and promotion 
of state economic interests. Either imposing liability on a party not at fault, or shielding an 
at-fault party from liability serves the same purpose—maintaining social stability, which 
is at core of the socialized liability principle.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On December 26, 2009, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
enacted the Tort Liability Law (TLL), the first comprehensive tort code in the history of 
the People’s Republic of China (the PRC). It took effect on July 1, 2010.2 The TLL is 
composed of ninety-two articles in twelve chapters.3 Consistent with codes in other areas 
of law, the first few chapters of the TLL lay out general principles.4 The remaining chapters 
focus on specific liabilities for injuries caused by defective products, automobile accidents, 
medical malpractice, environmental pollution, domesticated animals, abnormally 
dangerous activities, and invasion of personal property.5 
 
The TLL claims to protect individuals’ civil rights and interests, punish and prevent 
tortious conduct, and maintain social harmony and stability.6 It offers a wide range of 
protection for individual rights, such as the rights to life, health, name, reputation, honor, 
self-image, privacy, marital autonomy, guardianship, ownership, security, copyright, 
patent, trademark, discovery, equities, and succession.7 Chinese academia often views tort 
law as a private law, which supposedly recognizes the individual autonomy of the parties 
more than any other areas of law.8 In fact, however, the TLL is deeply characterized by 
																																								 																				
2 Id. 
3 Id.   
4 Id. From Chapter I to Chapter IV, the TLL covers General Provisions, Constituting Liability and 
Methods of Assuming Liability, Circumstances to Waive Liability and Mitigate Liability and 
Special Provision on Tortfeasors.  
5 See id. at Chapter V to Chapter XI.  
6 TLL, supra note 1, at Art. 1.   
7 Id. at Art. 2.   
8 See generally Yang Gengde (阳庚德), Sifa Chengfa Lun (私法惩罚论) [On the Punitive Nature 
of Private Law], 21 (6) PEKING U. L. J. (中外法学) 835, 835 (2009). (arguing that it is not settled 
whether tort law, as a private law, should punish tortfeasors)  Li Xia (李霞), Gaokong Paowu 
Zhiren Sunhai de Falv Jiuji (高空抛物致人损害的法律救济) [The legal remedies for injuries 
caused by falling objects], J. SHANDONG U. (SOC. SCI. ED,) (山东大学学报) 113, 116 (2011)  
(arguing that Article 87 of the TLL should be based on the principle of private law); Sun Zhengwei 
(孙政伟)， Lun Sifa Shang de Chengfa （论私法上的惩罚）[The penalties based on private 
law], 140 (5) J. ZHEJIANG GONGSHANG U. (浙江工商大学学报) 53, 54 (2016) (arguing the 
German jurisprudence on the dichotomy of private and public law has deeply influenced the study 





socialism and is used as a tool to maintain social stability, which is the overwhelming goal 
of the state.9 It is impossible for the TLL to remain independent and free from political 
influence.10  
																																								 																				
of Chinese civil law); Zhang Jiayong (张家勇)，Lun Tongyi Taopai Ren Dui Taopai Jidongche 
Zhaoshi de Peichang Zeren--Yi Gongsi Fa de Guanxi Wei Shijiao (论同意套牌人对套牌机动车
肇事的赔偿责任—以公私法的关系为视角) [The liabilities for a driver who fraudulently uses a 
license plate and causes injuries to others—from a perspective of private and public law] 203 (12) 
JINAN J. (PHI. & SOC. SCI. ED.) (暨南学报), 101, 108 (2015) (deeming tort law as a private law); 
Wu Yuanyuan (吴元元), Falv Fu’ai Zhuyi yu Qinquanfa zhi Shi (法律父爱主义与侵权法之失) 
[Legal paternalism and the failure of tort law], 70 (3) J. EAST CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L. (华东政
法大学学报)133, 133 (2010) (stating that tort law belongs in the category of private law); Bai Jiang 
(白江), Woguo Ying Kuoda Chengfa Xing Peichang zai Qinquanfa Zhong de Shiyong Fanwei (我
国应扩大惩罚赔偿在侵权法中的适用范围) [China should expand the scope of their application 
of punitive damages in tort cases], 9 (3) TSINGHUA U. L. J. 111, 118 (清华法学) (2015) (arguing 
that a tortious act violates private law). 
9 Shen Huiwen (申惠文), Woguo 《 Qinquan Zeren Fa 》 Sunhai Buchang Tiaokuan De Jieshi 
Lun (我国《侵权责任法》损害补偿条款的解释论) [Comments On The Interpretation Of The 
Compensation Provisions In The TLL] 91, J. OF SW. U. OF POL. SCI. & L.(西南政法大学学报) 
(2014) (arguing the TLL is the product of the socialist jurisprudence), 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleFullText.aspx?ArticleId=91118; Yuan Wenquan and Yang 
Tianhong (袁文全 杨天红)，Jiangou Da Guimo Qinquan Zonghe Yingdui Tixi de Biyao Xing Ji 
Jiben Shexiang—Jiyu Qinquan Zeren Fa de Lifa Mudi建构大规模侵权综合应对体系的必要性
及基本设想---基于《侵权责任法》的立法目的 [The necessity of constructing a comprehensive 
responsive system for dealing with mass torts---A study of the legislative purpose of the TLL], 12 
J. S.W. U. Nationalities (L. Sci. Ed.) (西南民族大学学报)，93，95（2014）(arguing that mass 
torts could seriously damage public trust in the government making it necessary to establish a 
system to provide adequate compensation for tort victims, who could become a potential force to 
cause social unrest if they are left uncompensated); Yuan Wenquan and Yang Tianhong (袁文全 
杨天红)， Zhengfu Jiuji Da Guimo Qinquan de Falv Kaoliang政府救济大规模侵权的法律考量 
[Some thoughts on the remedies provided by the government in mass torts], 200 (3) J. Soc. Sci. (
社会科学辑刊) 90, 90-92 (2012) (arguing the lack of adequate compensation for tort victims 
threatens social stability);  Wu Liangjun (吴俍君)， Da Guimo Qinquan Sunhai Duoyuan Jiuji 
Jizhi de Jiangou大规模侵权损害多元化救济机制的建构 [A multi-faceted approach to providing 
remedies in mass tort cases], 26 (6) J. Sichuan U. Sci. & Eng. (Soc. Sci. Ed.)（四川科技大学学
报, 66, 68-70 (2011) (arguing that providing adequate remedies for victims in mass tort cases is 
conducive to maintaining social stability); Wang Liming (王利明), Jianli he Wanshan Duoyuan 
Hua de Shouhai Ren Jiuji Jizhi 建立和完善多元化的受害人救济机制 [Establishing and 
improving a well maintained and multifaceted system to provide tort victims with legal remedies]，
4 J. Chinese L. (中国法学) 146, 150 (2009) (claiming the lack of remedies for tort victims would 
cause social unrest).   
10 The above-cited articles invariably argue the necessity for the government to establish funds for 







This article explores two unique aspects of the Chinese Tort Liability Law (TLL): (1) 
Article 24 holds that a party not at fault shall share the loss with the victim in non-strict 
liability cases under undefined circumstances, and (2) the government often shields a party 
at fault from liability in mass tort cases by disregarding the TLL entirely. These two aspects 
may seem contradictory; however, they are both based on the same principle of socialized 
liability, which is first articulated in this article.   
 
Scholars often claim that Article 24 embodies the principle of equitable liability. This 
article challenges such claims and asserts that Article 24 is, in fact, inequitable because it 
allows a party not at fault to be held liable.  Article 24 defies the traditional notion that 
liability should not only be based on fault, but also proportional to fault. Thus, it failed to 
provide a clear standard of care that individuals and entities can follow to avoid liability.   
 
This article argues that the principle of socialized liability is helpful in discerning the 
essence of Article 24 and other related provisions in the TLL. The new principle explains 
why Chinese lawmakers and courts are willing to deviate from fault-based liability, the 
bedrock of Western tort law. Through the lens of socialized liability, this article analyzes 
leading tort cases that have invoked Article 24 and related provisions, as well as several 
incidents where the government has deliberately disregarded the TLL. This analysis reveals 
that the socialized liability principle aligns well with the broader goals the Chinese 
government intends to achieve, in particular, maintenance of social stability and promotion 
of state economic interests. Either imposing liability on a party not at fault, or shielding an 
at-fault party from liability serves the same purpose—maintaining social stability, which 
is at core of the socialized liability principle.  
 
II. FROM EQUITABLE LIABILITY TO SOCIALIZED LIABILITY 
 
A. EQUITABLE LIABILITY (公平原则) 
 
Scholars claim that the principle of equitable liability originated from some earlier versions 
of provisions of German and Soviet civil law.11  In 1900, a draft amendment of the German 
Civil Code provided that the court could require an actor who was not at fault to 
																																								 																				
tort victims to maintain social stability. While the government plays a crucial role in providing tort 
compensation, it frequently directs courts to dismiss torts case brought by individual tort victims, 
especially, in mass tort cases. See also Section VII of the article.  
11 See Cao Xianfeng (曹险峰)， Lun Gongping Zeren De Shiyong —— Yidui 《 Qinquan Zeren 
Fa 》 Di 24 Tiao De Jieshi Lun Yandu Wei Zhongxin， (论公平责任的适用——以对《侵权责
任法》第24条的解释论研读为中心) [The Application of Article 24 of the TLL and the Equitable 
Liability Principle], J. N.W. U. POL. SCI. & L. (LEGAL SCI.), (西北政法大学学报) 104, 105, 
(2012). 





compensate the victim based on circumstances.12 Scholars immediately reacted with 
disapproval, claiming that the proposed provision was so vague that it was intolerable.13 
As a result, the provision was not included in the revised German law.14  
 
According to Article 406 of the Soviet Union Civil Code of 1922, if an actor was not liable 
for the victim’s harm, the court could still order the actor to compensate the victim based 
on wealth situations of the two parties.15 This provision was hardly applied in the practice, 
even to Soviet jurists, who criticized Article 406 for creating legal uncertainty.16 With the 
development of the socialist welfare system, which substantially diminished the wealth gap 
among the people, the equitable liability provision became obsolete in Soviet law in 1964.17  
 
In 1986, China enacted the first outline of the civil law entitled The General Principles of 
Civil Law (the GPCL), which borrowed heavily from both German and Soviet law.18 
Article 132 of the GPCL provides, “if none of the parties are at fault in causing damage, 
they may share civil liability according to the actual circumstances.”19 This provision 
served as the basis of Article 24 of the TLL.20  
 
B. SOCIALIZED LIABILITY (责任社会化) 
 
By invoking equitable liability, Chinese courts grant relief to victims even though the 
defendant is not at fault in non-strict liability cases. This arcane aspect of the Chinese tort 
law puzzles foreign scholars who are accustomed to tort cases where fault is almost a 
																																								 																				
12 Chen Benhan (陈本寒), Chen Ying (陈英), Gongping Zeren Guize Yuanze De Zai Tantao—
Jianping Woguo 《 Qinquan Zeren Fa 》 Di 24 Tiao Lijie Yu Shiyong, (公平责任归责原则的再
探讨—兼评我国《侵权责任法》第 24 条的理解与适用) [Comments on Understanding and 
Applying Article 24 of the TLL], 172 L. REV. (法学评论), 136, 140 (2012).  
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 See Cao, supra note 11.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Percy R. Luney Jr., Traditions and Foreign Influences: Systems of Law in China and Japan, 52 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 140 (1989) (“The German-style Soviet Code's influence is readily 
apparent in the General Principles’ ‘socialist’ provisions.”). 
19 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [The General 
Principles of Civil Law (GPCL)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong. April 12, 1986, 
effective Jan. 1, 1987) (Lawinfochina).  
20 Chen Ke (陈科), Gongping Zeren Yiban Tiaokuan de Sifa Shiyong—Yi 100 fen Qinquan An’li 
Panjueshu Wei Fenxi Yangben (公平责任一般条款的司法适用—以100份侵权案件判决书为分
析样本) [The study of  the equity principle in the judicial practices by examining 100 torts cases], 
1 J. Application of L. (法律适用) 11, 11 (2015). (stating that Article 24 of the TLL is derived from 
Article 132 of the GPCL) 







prerequisite for remedy.21 Instead of using the term “equitable liability,” this article refers 
it as “socialized liability.” The latter term is more accurate and helpful in discerning the 
essence of Article 24 and other related articles in the TLL. 
 
The principle of socialized liability holds that tort liability should be imposed or limited as 
necessary to ensure social stability or confidence in the Communist Party of China (the 
Party). In practice, the principle allows Chinese courts to hold a party who is not at fault 
liable for a victim’s injuries. In addition, it also allows courts to deny claims against a party 
who is at fault in mass tort cases. 
 
As a unique legal concept of recent origin, socialized liability has no well-defined 
boundaries, and it lacks certainty and predictability. Consequently, individuals and 
property owners do not know how to avoid liability. Despite its ambiguity, socialized 
liability remains an essential legal basis for Chinese courts to allocate losses among parties. 
Specifically, socialized liability serves two main social goals, which may at times overlap 
or conflict with each other:  
 
First, socialized liability protects the state’s economic interests. Since the economic 
reforms in the early 1980s, China has transitioned from a Soviet-style planned economy to 
a so-called market economy with Chinese characteristics.22 The transition, however, is 
incomplete as China is still a command economy, in which the state controls most of the 
vital industrial sectors, such as transportation, telecommunication, energy, banking, and 
health care.23 These state-owned enterprises or entities (SOEs) enjoy preferential treatment 
in laws compared to consumers and private competitors. The SOEs not only play a major 
role in shaping the law, but they can also impose pressure on courts in cases of industrial 
accidents. The government often instructs courts to interpret the law favorably to SOEs, or 
to simply deny claims against SOEs or other enterprises with strong government backing.24  
 
Second, socialized liability serves the Party’s goal of maintaining stability and control.25 
Since the founding of the PRC, the Party has firmly held onto its power through a 
																																								 																				
21 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, & Ellen M. Bublick, HORNBOOK ON TORTS 4 (2nd ed. 2016). 
(“In the great majority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the conclusion that the wrongdoer 
was at fault in a legally cognizable way.”). 
22 See generally, Justin Yifu Li, Lessons of China’s Transition from a Planned Economy to a Market 
Economy, THE DISTINGUISHED WSPIZ AND TIGER LECTURE AT KOZMINSKI SCHOOL OF 
MANAGEMENT, WARSAW, POLAND, Dec. 17, 2004,  
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1996/11/cj16n2-3.pdf.  
23 Scott Cendrowski, China’s Global 500 Companies Are Bigger Than Ever—And Mostly State-
Owned, FORTUNE (Jul. 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/china-global-500-government-
owned. 
24 See Section VII of this Article.  
25 See Susan Trevaskes et al. ed., THE POLITICS OF LAW AND STABILITY IN CHINA, 1 (2014).   





combination of military might, political coercion, ideological pressure, and constraining 
political enemies.26 The Party initially predicated its legitimacy on its leadership and 
sacrifice in gaining China’s independence from Western imperialists. After Mao’s 
generation in the late 1970s, however, the revolutionary narrative was less persuasive, 
particularly among the young, many of whom were better educated and extensively 
exposed to Western ideas.27 Consequently, the Party developed a new narrative arguing 
that it deserves to govern the country because it will continue to ensure economic 
prosperity and social stability.28  
 
Although the new narrative appeals to wide audiences, China’s pursuit of economic 
prosperity has produced very uneven results.29 The rapidly increasing gap between the rich 
and poor has contributed to social instability. Social unrest poses a serious challenge to the 
Party, which seems unable to eliminate the prosperity gap.30 In the absence of democratic 
discourse, the Party faces enormous difficulties in detecting elements of dissatisfaction.31 
Therefore, the Party has become oversensitive about public protests. As Professor Wei 
Zhang observed, “Unlike the democracies where the median voter’s opinion tends to 
prevail, the authoritarian government in China cares more about ‘the vocal extremists who 
are most likely to take to the street.’”32 Therefore, a top priority for the Party is to respond 
to high-profile controversies or natural disasters. In doing so, the Party attempts to 
demonstrate its genuine concern for its citizens and to solidify its public support in order 
to enhance its legitimacy.33  
 
																																								 																				
26 Xin Ren, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION, 47–64 (1997).  
27 See Roger V. Des Forges, Ning Luo, Yen-bo Wu, Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: 
Chinese and American Reflections, 109 (1993). By China’s official estimates, the number of 
Chinese students who study abroad each year is between 700,000 and 800,000. See also Luo 
Wangshu, More Chinese Set to Study Overseas, China Daily, Mar. 8, 2017, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017twosession/2017-03/08/content_28470916.htm. 
28See Jinghan Zeng, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S CAPACITY TO RULE: IDEOLOGY, 
LEGITIMACY AND COHESION, § 1.2 (2015).   
29 See Ian Talley, China Is One of the Most Unequal Countries in the World, IMF Paper Says, 
WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/03/26/china-is-one-of-most-
unequal-countries-in-the-world-imf-paper-says/.   
30 See Ansuya Harijani, China Wealth Gap May Be Far Worse Than Official Estimates, CNBC 
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/29/china-wealth-gap-may-be-far-worse-than-
official-estimates.html 
31 See Wei Zhang, Understanding the Law of Torts in China: A Political Economy Perspective, 11 
U. PENN. ASIAN L. REV. 171, 194 (2016).   
32 Id.  
33 KJELD ERIK BRØDSGAARD (ed.), CHINESE POLITICS AS FRAGMENTED AUTHORITARIANISM: 
EARTHQUAKES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, 89 (2016).  







The TLL is one of the tools the Party uses to solve thorny social issues and prevent 
disgruntled victims from taking their grievances to social media or even the streets. Viewed 
against this background, a fault-based tort principle appears burdensome and difficult to 
manipulate to the Party’s liking. In addition, inquiries into fault can expose the problems 
of mismanagement and corruption, attracting unnecessary attention and further arousing 
public resentment.34 
 
Socialized liability, however, is flexible and adaptive. A court can quickly compensate 
victims without assigning fault. In some cases, the government and the Party have relied 
on the principle of socialized liability to force victims to accept low compensation and 
promise not to pursue further legal actions. Ironically, an inquiry into fault in mass tort 
cases, as the Party sees it, could lead to instability. Thus, socialized liability will remain as 
an indispensable principle in the TLL precisely because it is so ambiguous and can be 
easily manipulated to reach whatever legal result the Party favors.  
 
III. CASES BASED ON ARTICLE 24 OF THE TLL 
 
Article 24 of the TLL provides, “if neither the victim nor the actor is at fault for the harm 
to the victim, the two parties may share the victim’s loss according to the circumstances.”35 
From the wording of the Article, it is unclear when and how courts should invoke it. The 
words, such as “may,” “share,” and “circumstances” can cause confusion among judges, 
lawyers, and academics. Since there is no official interpretation from the Supreme People’s 
Court, lower courts often take a broad approach in applying Article 24, rather than 
methodically breaking down the elements in a traditional way of applying a statute.36 In 
																																								 																				
34 Gu Weixia, Responsive Justice in China During Transitional Times: Revisiting the Juggling Path 
Between Adjudicatory and Mediatory Justice, 14 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 49, 54 (2015) 
(stating that the government required judges to resolve cases that would cause social unrest through 
mediation). See also Lawyers Warned to Shun Milk Suits, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,  Sept. 
23, 2008, http://www.scmp.com/article/653669/lawyers-warned-shun-milk-suits (stating that the 
government prohibited lawyers from representing victims in mass torts cases); Jun Xie and Lijuan 
Sun, Access to Collective Litigation in China: A Tough Work, 3 J. POL. & L. 45, 48 (2010), 
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/5277.   
35 TLL, supra note 1, at Art. 24.  
36 While writing this article, the author reviewed hundreds of cases that applied Article 24 of the 
TLL from the Supreme People’s Court database, which is available at wenshu.court.gov.cn. From 
these cases, it is extremely difficult to find any reasoning from the courts, especially the lower 
courts, as to why and when Article 24 is applicable.  The following are typical examples where 
courts found that defendants were not at fault, but ordered them to share plaintiffs’ losses. 
(1) In China, it is a custom for the groom to carry the bride to their decorated bedroom, a ritual 
that symbolizes a harmonious and happy life. In such a process, Luo Wenjun slipped and 
fell on a wet floor while he was carrying his bride Qiu Yingxia. As a result, Qiu flew out 
of Luo’s arms and hit a pole, receiving severe injuries. Qiu sued Luo for medical expenses 
and living costs. Although the court found Luo free from fault, it ordered him to pay Qiu 






RMB 1,045 ($150) based on Article 24 of the TLL. The court did not explain why Article 
24 was applicable in this case. Qiu Yingxia Yu Luo Wenjun Jiankang Quan Jiufen Yishen 
Minshi Panjue Shu岳映霞与罗文军健康权纠纷一审民事判决书 (The Court Order in 
the Civil Case of Qiu Yingxia v. Luo Wenjun), (甘肃省秦安县人民法院) (Gansu Province 
Qin’an County People’s Ct., Mar. 24, 2014) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>;  
(2) In this case, a student slipped and fell on his way from the school’s cafeteria to the 
dormitory, causing him to lose four front teeth. The student filed a lawsuit against the 
school for negligence. Even though the court found that the school was not negligent, it 
ordered that the school pay the plaintiff RMB 14,148 ($ 2,200) for the implantation of his 
teeth. The court cited Article 24 of the TLL without explaining why and how it applied in 
this case. Li Yang Yu Pingdu Shi Dijiu Zhongxue Yishen Minshi Panjue Shu李扬与平度市
第九中学一审民事判决书 (The Court Order in the Civil Case of Li Yang v. Pingdu No. 9 
Middle School), (山东省平度市⼈⺠法院) (Shandong Province Pingdu County People’s 
Ct., June 20, 2013) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>; 
(3) In this case, a student broke his right hand in a physical education class while he attempted 
to pass a pommel horse under the teacher’s supervision. The court agreed with the school 
that the pommel horse routine for basic gymnastic education was a state-required course 
that all students must learn and pass. However, based on Article 24 of the TLL, the court 
required the school to share 40% of the student’s loss. Again, the court did not elaborate 
why the article was applicable. Wei shijie Yu Shanghai Shi Liaoyang Zhongxue Jiaoyu 
Jigou Zeren Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjue Shu魏仕杰与上海市辽阳中学教育机构责任纠
纷一审民事判决书 The Court Order in the Civil Case of Wei Shijie v. Shanghai Liaoyang 
Education Bureau (上海市杨浦区人民法院) (Shanghai Yangpu District People’s Ct., 
April 20, 2015) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>;  
(4) As guests, the plaintiff and defendant attended a party to celebrate the completion of a new 
house. According to the local custom, guests participated in a game to hunt for steam-buns.  
During the game, the defendant accidently fell and landed on the plaintiff’s right foot, 
causing injuries. The court found that the defendant was not at fault, but it still ordered him 
to pay RMB 1,300 ($200) for the plaintiff’s medical expenses. In addition, the court 
ordered the defendant to share one half of the court filing fees, RMB 400 ($60). The court 
only cited Article 24 of the TLL, but did not offer any explanation why the provision was 
relevant to the case. Zhou Bifeng Yu Fang Taiyuan Shengming Quan, Jiankang Quan, 
Shenti Quan Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjue Shu 周碧凤与方泰源生命、健康权、身体权
纠纷一审民事判决书The Court Order in a Civil Case of Zhou Bifeng v. Fang Taiyuan 
Regarding Rights of Life, Health and Boby (浙江省建德市人民法院) (Zhejiang Province 
Jiande People’s Ct., Dec. 5, 2014) <wenshu.court.gov.cn.>; 
(5) Wu voluntarily helped Lu to fix a waterpipe without expecting to receive payment. Wu 
suspended his work because he did not feel well. Several hours later, Wu died of heart 
failure. Wu’s relatives sued Lu for damages. Even though the court did not find fault with 
Lu, it held that Article 24 was applicable and required Lu to share 10% of Wu’s medical 
and funeral expenses. Unlike other cases, the court provided two lines in the judgment 
reasoning that its holding was to promote the spirit of voluntariness and mutual assistance. 
In fact, such a ruling is counterproductive, because people would refuse voluntary help for 







2010，the Research Institute of the TLL at the Supreme People’s Court, led by the then 
Vice President Xi Xiaoming, published a book entitled, The Understanding and 
Application of the TLL.37 Even though it is not legally binding, the book is regarded as a 
reliable source for understanding Chinese tort law. In this book, Xi explained the following 
key terms of Article 24:38  
 
“Loss” and “Liability” According to Xi, Article 24 does not serve as a basis for assessing 
whether the defendant is at fault. Thus, if a court requires the defendant to be responsible 
for the victim’s loss, it does not necessarily mean he or she was actually at fault.39 Xi 
cautioned the courts not to treat Article 24 as requiring strict liability.40  
 
“May” and “share” Xi stated that sharing the victim’s loss should not be mandatory for 
the defendant.41 However, he failed to clarify whether the defendant has a choice not to 
share the loss. As the subsequent cases show, no court has followed Xi’s advice. 
 
“According to circumstances” Xi stated that because Article 24 is not a fault based 
provision, the sole basis for allocating the loss between the defendant and plaintiff is the 
parties’ respective wealth.42 This provision “complies with the virtues, such as equity, 
justice, honesty, friendship and sympathy, which are broadly recognized and accepted by 
the public and conducive to building a harmonious society.”43 In short, the “circumstances” 
in this Article means “[the parties’ respective] income, expenditure and responsibility to 
the family and society.”44 
 
Xi further stated that if the victim’s financial state has deteriorated seriously due to the 
injuries, the court should require a well-to-do defendant to bear the entire loss.45 If the harm 
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39 See id. at 182.  
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is insignificant, the court should hold the plaintiff responsible for his or her own loss.46 If 
the plaintiff is wealthier than the defendant, the plaintiff should bear all the loss. If the 
defendant has insurance, he or she should bear more of the loss.47  
 
Even though Xi stated that Article 24 can only be used in limited cases,48 courts have 
increasingly used the Article as a legal basis for deciding regular tort cases.49 In 2011, there 
were only two cases based on Article 24, but in 2016, the number of cases based on Article 
24 exceeded 700.50 In total, courts have applied the Article more than 2,000 times in all the 
cases that the Supreme People’s Court has collected since 2011.51 After an extensive 
review of recent litigation, this article has selected the following cases to demonstrate how 
courts have applied the socialized liability principle. Some cases are more analytical than 
others, but the results are the same: courts have regularly held that parties not at fault must 
share losses with victims.  
 
A. OU ZUMING V. HYDRAULIC POWER (HP)  
 
HP52 is a hydraulic power station that maintains several river locks. In July 2011, HP 
notified the local maritime department that it would release river locks for routine 
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maintenance and asked the department to warn all passing vessels of the high level of water 
in the river. By taking such measures, HP complied with state regulations regarding river 
lock releases. The record showed that HP followed the regulation carefully by releasing 
the locks gradually and sounding horns to ensure that passing vessels had ample time to 
make the adjustment for the water rise. Mr. Ou Zuming, however, suffered severe property 
damage to his flat-bottomed boat loaded with cargo during the lock release. Subsequently, 
Ou Zuming sued HP, claiming that HP was negligent in releasing the water locks or, in the 
alternative, should be held strictly liable for his loss.53  
 
The court first denied Ou Zuming’s strict liability claim based on Article 132 of the 
GPCL.54 The court reasoned that the river lock release was not one of the enumerated 
activities considered abnormally dangerous according to the GPCL. Ou Zuming’s property 
was located two kilometers away from the river locks and there was a large inlet, which 
reduced the impact of the water rise. Consequently, Ou Zuming had an opportunity to react 
to the release and protect his property. Therefore, HP was not strictly liable for Ou 
Zuming’s loss. On the claim for negligence, the court reasoned that HP took all the 
necessary measures to comply with the state regulation. Thus, HP was not negligent in 
releasing the river locks. It seemed that the court was ready to rule in favor of HP, but, in 
the end, it upheld the lower court’s decision requiring HP to pay RMB 200,000 ($30,000) 
to cover Ou Zuming’s property loss based on Article 24 of the TLL.55  
 
B. HU V. CHEN  
 
On June 27, 2016, Chen Yunhai (Chen) hired Wu Daozhong (Wu) to refurbish the ceiling 
of Chen’s apartment.56 The next day, Chen found Wu lying on the floor unconscious. Chen 
immediately called an ambulance to take Wu to the hospital, where he was diagnosed as 
possibly having suffered from a stroke. Chen paid RMB 1,800 ($266) for Wu’s medical 
expenses. Wu subsequently checked into other hospitals for treatment before he died on 
December 5, 2016. Wu’s widow sued Chen to recover damages for part of the medical 
expenses, life support costs, funeral costs, and emotional distress in the amount of RMB 
269,718.40 ($39,929). The trial court reasoned that the employment relationship between 
Chen and Wu had no connection with Wu’s illness and his death and that Chen took 
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necessary measures to provide assistance for Wu’s rescue. Therefore, Chen was not at fault 
and was not liable for Wu’s illness and death. Based on Article 24 of the TLL, however, 
the court held that Chen must share a portion of Wu’s loss. It ordered Chen to pay RMB 
15,000 ($2,220) in addition to the RMB 1,800 ($266) payment that Chen had already made 
for Wu’s medical bills.57   
 
Wu’s widow appealed the trial court decision, claiming that it erroneously applied Article 
24 and that Chen should share a large portion of the loss. The appellate court affirmed the 
trial court’s decision. In its reasoning, the appellate court provided some guidance on the 
application of Article 24, which was rare for a Chinese court to do. The court emphasized 
that the basic principle of tort law is liability based on fault in non-strict-liability cases. 
Article 24 does not require parties not at fault to share liability, but only to share the loss 
under certain circumstances. “Sharing loss” here does not mean that the two parties split 
the loss equally. The court further interpreted the phrase “under the circumstances,” in the 
sense that by invoking Article 24, courts should consider the following factors in deciding 
about the amount of loss that the party not at fault should share:58  
 
(1) The manner with which defendant acted [even if he or she was not at fault];   
(2) The circumstance under which the defendant acted;  
(3) The amount of loss to the plaintiff;  
(4) The benefit that defendant received from the plaintiff;  
(5) The disparity in wealth between the defendant and plaintiff.59 
 
 In this case, the appellate court found that the amount the trial court required Chen to share 
was reasonable and denied the plaintiff’s claim for additional payment.  
 
C. THE APPLICATION OF SOCIALIZED LIABILITY IN OU ZUMING AND HU  
 
The Ou Zuming case and the Hu case were factually different and tried in different courts, 
one in the most remote region and the other in Beijing. Nevertheless, the ultimate outcomes 
in both cases were the same: the wealthier defendants were ordered to pay for damages to 
the desperate plaintiffs. Based on the socialized liability principle, the courts in both cases 
obligated the defendants to share some of their wealth with the plaintiffs, even though 
neither defendant was at fault.  
 
In Ou Zuming, the wealth gap and potential for social discontent was apparent to the court. 
HP was a subsidiary of Chongqing Longzhu Power Group, a government-affiliated 
company with a registered capital of close to RMB 300 million ($45 million). Compared 
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with HP, Mr. Ou Zuming’s business was negligible. The $30,000 payment was only a tiny 
fraction of HP’s wealth but vital for Mr. Ou Zuming to salvage his shattered business and 
keep his workers employed. If the court had applied the principle of fault-based liability 
and denied Mr. Ou Zuming’s claim, Mr. Ou Zuming and his fellow workers probably 
would have protested the HP and the government. By applying the socialized liability 
principle, however, the court avoided the potential for social unrest.   
 
Similarly, in Hu, the court was fully aware of the wealth gap between the two parties, which 
was reflected in the judgment. In 2016, the property values in Beijing increased by nearly 
30% annually.60 An average two-bedroom apartment (80 square meters, or 860 square feet) 
in Beijing was worth more than RMB 4,000,000 ($600,000).61 It was obvious to the court 
that Chen’s wealth was far greater than that of Hu. As a migrant worker from Anhui 
Province, Hu could only sell his hard labor in order to survive in Beijing. Without adequate 
health insurance and pension benefits, Hu’s illness would quickly exhaust his life savings 
and lead to bankruptcy. If uncompensated, Hu’s family members could have petition the 
government for assistance. By invoking Article 24 in Hu, the court relieved pressure on the 
government.   
 
IV. ARTICLE 87 AND FALLING OBJECT CASES  
 
While the rapid urbanization movement has improved living standards in China, it has also 
created a unique legal problem: injury to a person by an object that falls from a multi-unit 
residential building. Who is liable for the harm? Article 87 of the TLL, often referred to as 
the “falling objects provision,” offers a clear answer: all occupants of the building, except 
those who can exculpate themselves, are liable for the injury.  
 
A. LUO V. LAO  
 
On November 7, 2005,62 while Mr. Luo Jiezhi was eating dinner outside an apartment 
building owned by Lao Xiquan (the Owner), a steel bar fell from above and hit Luo’s right 
wrist, causing severe injuries.63 At the time of the incident, the Owner had a metal structure 
to dry meat on the top of the building.  Luo sued the Owner to recover medical and other 
expenses.64 The court physician certified that Luo suffered an 8th degree disability, which 
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made him unable to work. The court relied on Article 126 of the GPCL, which states that 
“if a building or any other installation or an object placed or hung on a structure collapses, 
detaches, or drops and causes damage to others, its owner or manager shall bear civil 
liability, unless he can prove he is not at fault.”65 The court held for Luo, the plaintiff, 
because the Owner failed to produce proper evidence that he was not at fault.66  
 
In practice, it is not enough for an owner to prove that he exercised reasonable care under 
Article 126 of the GPCL. He has to prove that it was a third party, the plaintiff, or a natural 
force that caused the plaintiff’s injury.67 Under the equitable liability principle in the TLL, 
if neither the owner nor the plaintiff was at fault, the owner should still share the plaintiff’s 
loss to the best of his ability.68 The payment is “not absolutely mandatory in nature.”69 The 
share that the owner should pay depends on his financial situation. The better the financial 
situation of the owner, the more he would have to pay for the cost of the plaintiff’s 
injuries.70  
 
B. WEN V. OWNER  
 
On May 11, 2000, Mr. Hao was chatting with his neighbor outside a residential building, 
in which twenty-two families lived.71 An ashtray suddenly fell from the building and 
fractured Hao’s skull. Hao became mentally disabled and lost his ability to speak. Unable 
to find out who threw the ashtray, Hao sued the twenty-two families in the building. 
Except for two families that proved that they were not in the building, the remaining 
twenty families failed to prove that they did not throw the ashtray. Therefore, the court 
held that the twenty families were responsible for equal shares of Hao’s injuries.72 
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C. ARTICLE 87 AND SOCIALIZED LIABILITY 
 
Under Article 87, socialized liability is imposed because there is no well-developed social 
safety net for injured victims to seek recovery. If a court followed traditional fault-based 
principles, a victim injured by a falling object would likely be left without a remedy 
because the costs to find the true tortfeasor and hold him liable would be prohibitively high.  
 
Article 87, which enjoys support from both the public and the academia, has changed urban 
living in various ways. Some homeowner management companies install security cameras 
to catch wrongdoers, while others require occupants to contribute to a designated fund, 
which covers the costs for injuries caused by falling objects. Article 87 also makes 
neighbors to be vigilant about suspicious acts in the community. In addition, the Article 
spreads the loss of accidents in multi-unit dwellings by increasing the costs of living in 
them.  
 
V. POSTHUMOUS DEFAMATION  
 
One of the unique aspects of the Chinese tort law on emotional distress is that it allows 
close relatives of the deceased to sue for emotional damages when a tortfeasor damages 
the reputation or invades the privacy of the deceased. Even though there is no statutory 
basis for this type of lawsuit, the Supreme People’s Court issued an interpretation that 
recognizes the right of a posthumous reputation of a deceased person:  
 
Close relatives of the dead can sue for emotional damages against a tortfeasor 
who 
(1) infringed upon the dead’s name, likeness, reputation, or honor by insulting, 
libeling, disparaging, vilifying, or by other means contrary to public interests or 
morality; or 
(2) illegally disclosed or used the privacy of the dead or infringed upon the 
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A. CHEN V. WU  
 
In 1999, Wu Si published a book, Mao’s Peasant—Chen Yonggui, which was serialized in 
the Beijing Youth Daily.74 Chen, who passed away in 1986, held the office of Vice Premier 
of the State Council (the central cabinet of the Chinese government) from 1975 to 1980, 
even though he was illiterate. Rising from a peasant in a remote village in the Shanxi 
Province to a member of the Politburo of the Party, Chen owed his sudden fame primarily 
to Mao’s disastrous policy choices during the peak of the Cultural Revolution.75 In the 
book, Wu portrayed Chen’s early life, especially his role during the Japanese occupation 
from 1937 to 1945. Relying on published articles, including an article by Chen’s elder son, 
and other official archives, Wu claimed that Chen was a member of the “peace maintenance 
group,” a puppet government established by the Japanese to manage affairs in the occupied 
areas.76 In that position, Chen was responsible for collecting grains and vital information 
for the Japanese army. After World War II, Chen was arrested and humiliated for his role 
in aiding the Japanese occupiers.  In his application for Party membership after the war, 
Chen acknowledged his past involvement in the “peace maintenance group” and sought 
the Party’s forgiveness. All these files regarding Chen’s history were well kept in the 
Party’s archives. Wu cited the files together with other historical records, memoirs, and 
interviews in his book to support his claim.77 
 
In 2002, Chen Yonggui’s wife, and other close relatives sued Wu for defaming the late 
Vice Premier through Wu’s disclosure of Chen’s treasonous past, and for degrading Chen’s 
status as a prominent state official and as a member of the respected party elite. The 
relatives requested the court to order Wu and the publisher to issue a public apology to 
Chen’s family. In addition, the relatives claimed that they suffered emotional distress 
because of Wu’s book and sought RMB 100,000 ($14,000) for emotional damages.78 
 
In defense, Wu and the publisher provided a detailed list of publications, archives, personal 
memoirs, and interviews, claiming that the author did not fabricate the facts with intent to 
defame Chen. In fact, there was an article written by Chen’s elder son, which detailed 
Chen’s role in the “peace maintenance group.”79 Wu claimed that he accurately depicted 
Chen’s early life based on his extensive research and interviews. While the court did not 
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dispute that the author had no intent to smear Chen, it held that Wu cited unauthoritative 
sources because neither the Party nor the government validated personal memoirs. 
Furthermore, the author had failed to verify the authoritativeness and authenticity of the 
sources that he cited in the book. The court’s reasoning instantly drew criticism from the 
academia. Professor He Bing commented:  
 
The judge here probably wanted to say that authors must rely on 
authoritative materials in analyzing historical events. The problem is, 
however, what are authoritative materials? Who will decide what kinds of 
materials are authoritative? Should the judge have the power to decide what 
materials that an author must use in his academic research? This judgement 
is questionable because it suppresses academic freedom. Should authors be 
legally liable for their mistakes in the research? If the answer is yes, it will 
have a chilling effect on academic research.80 
 
Despite strong criticism, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision that Wu and 
the publisher must issue an official public apology in the Beijing Youth Daily and pay RMB 
20,000 ($2,960) for emotional damages.  
 
Unlike previous cases, the court in Chen v. Wu did not apply the socialized liability 
principle to bridge the wealth gap between the two parties. As a prolific writer, Wu did not 
face financial hardship in paying the damages. Instead, the court applied the socialized 
liability principle to prohibit Wu from questioning the official narrative of the Party’s 
history. Through this case, the court essentially warned liberal intellectuals that any attempt 
to shed a different light on the Party’s legacy, even with credible evidence, would lead to 
a prosecution for defamation, a serious offense punishable by fines, forced apology, or 
even imprisonment.81 The logic is simple: the Party’s historical accounts, however 
embellished, serve as the foundation for its legitimacy to govern the country. Questioning 
the Party’s past leads the public to lose faith in the Party and thus threatens social stability. 
In Chen v. Wu, the versatile aspect of the socialized liability principle became the basis for 
the court to manipulate the defamation law to safeguard the Party’s unblemished image.  
 
VI. THE COMPLICATIONS OF SOCIALIZED LIABILITY  
 
The principle of socialized liability plays a unique role in the Chinese legal system. If a 
court adjudicates tort cases exclusively on a fault basis, some victims will be remediless 
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because not all defendants are at fault. By leaving a victim empty-handed, however, a court 
runs the risks of creating serious social problems. A victim, who has lost his or her earning 
capacity due to injuries, often ends up being both financially insolvent and emotionally 
distraught. In the absence of a well-maintained social safety net, uncompensated victims 
sometimes end up petitioning the government for the rest of their lives because they have 
no other options. Victims urge the government to award them with a sense of justice and 
welfare.  
 
For a Chinese court, compensating victims is more important than determining whether the 
defendants are at fault. As one Chinese scholar observed, the principle of equitable liability 
is a “Robin Hood” style social redistribution, by which the court compels the rich defendant 
to pay the poor victim regardless of fault.82 The principle, which is deeply rooted in 
socialism, has gone far beyond the realm of traditional tort law.83 In this sense, the Chinese 
government uses the tort law to achieve multiple goals, including providing social benefits 
to victims and equalizing the wealth between the rich and poor. However, the socialized 
liability principle is not a panacea for legal disputes in China, especially when the 
defendant is the government.   
 
A. THE CASE OF JI ZHONGXING  
 
Ji, like millions of migrants, left his village and went searching for a new life in the coastal 
cities.84 Upon his friend’s advice, Ji bought a motorbike and began to offer rides for money, 
competing for customers with licensed taxi drivers. During a crackdown on illegal taxis in 
2005, a group of police officers caught Ji, and he was severely beaten. When Ji woke up in 
the hospital, he realized that he was permanently paralyzed. Ji brought an administrative 
lawsuit against the officers and local government seeking compensation of RMB 
334,782.49 ($48,658.12).85 He also sued the officers in a tort suit, claiming RMB 
338,266.99 ($49,134.34) in damages.86 The local court, which is an integral part of the 
government, dismissed both of Ji’s lawsuits for lack of evidence.87 Without compensation, 
Ji quickly exhausted his savings by paying his medical bills. His brother brought him back 
to the village, where his father and other relatives took care of him.  
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Losing faith in the justice system, Ji petitioned the local government, which denied any 
wrongdoing.88 Ji went on to petition the central government in Beijing, which sent the case 
back to the local government. Under internal pressure, the police department finally offered 
Ji RMB 100,000 ($14,503), but it stated clearly that the payment was for humanitarian 
assistance only and was not intended as an admission of guilt.89 The police department 
asked Ji to sign a document, which Ji did not fully understand. In fact, the document he 
signed waived any further claim against the department. After spending nearly all of the 
payment to settle overdue medical bills, Ji remained destitute.90 The police department 
rejected Ji’s subsequent petitions by claiming that his acceptance of the payment legally 
barred him from pursuing any further claims. Ji was furious that the police department had 
tricked him into accepting the settlement offer without a chance to seek independent 
counsel. From then on, Ji was determined to protest the injustice at the Beijing International 
Airport.91 
 
On July 21, 2013, Ji detonated a homemade bomb while he was sitting in his wheelchair 
in the front lobby of the Beijing International Airport.92 Except for Ji, no one was hurt 
because he loudly warned travelers about the bomb and he did not throw it into the crowd.93 
The explosion caused severe injuries to Ji’s left hand, which was subsequently amputated.94 
During the trial, Ji’s lawyer argued that he did not intend to hurt anyone and used the airport 
lobby to protest the wrongs that the local government had done to him.  
 
Despite finding no intent, the court convicted Ji of the crimes of endangering public safety 
and engaging in an act of terrorism and sentenced him to prison for six years.95  To the 
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government’s surprise, Ji won public sympathy.96 If the local court had applied the 
socialized liability principle in the first place and required the police to compensate Ji, he 
would not have taken the extreme measures of protesting the injustice.97  
 
In cases such as Ji’s, the court often finds itself in a quandary: ruling in favor of the victim 
will jeopardize the judge’s opportunity for reappointment or promotion, but ruling for the 
government will leave the uncompensated victim with no choice but to resort to informal 
and sometimes extreme measures, resulting in public disturbance. Ji’s case demonstrates 
that the application of the socialized liability principle can be complicated when the 
government is a defendant.98 
 
VII. MASS TORTS, SOCIALIZED LIABILITY, AND DISUTILITY OF THE TORT LAW  
 
The primary purpose of the socialized liability principle is to maintain social stability. The 
application of the principle can take various forms. In dealing with negligence disputes 
among a small number of parties, courts use the principle to bypass fault-based analyses 
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and directly order a rich defendant to pay for a poor plaintiff’s injuries. In doing so, courts 
prevent disgruntled plaintiffs from threatening social stability.  
 
In mass tort cases, the government circumvents the entire legal proceeding by invoking the 
socialized liability principle. This dramatic application of the principle enables the 
government to prevent a large group of tort victims from filing a class action, which is 
deemed to be a serious threat to the foundation of the authoritarian regime. Top leaders of 
a local government may face demotion or even criminal investigation if a class action or 
public protest erupts under their watch. Thus, socialized liability has transformed mass tort 
from a legal issue into a sensitive political issue that courts are ill-equipped to resolve.  
 
To suppress any form of class actions and public protests in mass tort cases, the government 
usually takes the following measures: first, the government instructs courts to dismiss mass 
tort claims. When courts cease to apply the law, the TLL becomes a set of empty promises. 
Chinese courts are an integral part of the government, which controls the courts’ funding 
and appointments.99 Instead of being an independent branch, courts submit to the top 
leaders of the government. For example, the government of Guangxi Province issued a 
notice directing courts not to take 13 kinds of cases, all of which involved sensitive issues, 
including mass torts.100 Even though Chinese scholars criticized the notice for encroaching 
upon judicial independence,101 the government has continued to instruct courts, through 
internal directives, not to take cases that it deems sensitive.102 Furthermore, the government 
prohibits lawyers from representing mass tort plaintiffs. Lawyers who violate the 
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Second, the government forces the mass tort victims to accept low compensation and sign 
a promise not to pursue further litigation. In doing so, the government avoids judicial 
proceedings and minimizes the social impact of mass tort litigation, protects industry, and 
preserves social stability. Thus, the socialized liability principle applies in mass tort cases 
through an extra-judicial process firmly controlled by the government. The socialized 
liability principle in mass torts cases also denotes that it is both a socialist virtue and 
absolute obligation for mass torts victims to willingly accept government-set 
compensation, refrain from coordinating with other victims to protest inadequate 
settlement, and make personal sacrifices for the common good—a stable society.  
 
A key reason that the government restricts courts from taking mass tort cases is its concern 
that open litigation could expose corrupt practices and other crimes committed by 
government officials.104 In mass tort cases, the tortious parties are usually SOEs or 
enterprises with strong government backing. Any negative information about the defendant 
could taint the government’s image and cause the public to lose faith in the government.105 
Another reason could be that the government has little confidence in judicial resolution of 
mass tort cases.106 An unfavorable judgment, for instance, would cause victims to petition 
the central government in Beijing.107 Because the local leaders are not elected, but are 
appointed by the government at the higher level, they are accountable only to the higher 
government.108 Maintaining social stability is the most important job for local leaders. 
Victims’ petitions or protests would show that the local leaders have failed to do their 
jobs.109 Therefore, the government would rather handle mass tort cases by itself than having 
the courts resolving the issues.  
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Even without government instructions, judges are reluctant to take sensitive cases.110 They 
have the same concern that dissatisfied victims would take to the streets demanding 
adequate compensation, costing them their political career. Furthermore, the government 
evaluates judges annually based on a set of criteria, including whether parties accept their 
judgments and whether a higher court frequently overturns their judgments.111 Unlike 
adjudicating simple civil cases, judges in mass tort cases run a higher risk of provoking 
protests, which diminishes judges’ opportunity for reappointment and promotion.112  
Courts also avoid sensitive cases to increase the rate of resolution (the ratio of resolved 
cases to admitted cases) and thereby creating the impression that the courts are efficient. A 
higher rate of resolution can also serve as a basis for judges to receive a sizable year-end 
bonus.113 It would take courts more time and resources to handle mass tort cases than 
regular cases, and there is no certainty that courts could resolve them to the government’s 
satisfaction.114 Thus, it is in the best interest of a court to deny mass tort cases. In addition, 
court fees are based on a percentage of the amount in dispute. Even though the law requires 
courts to submit all court fees to the state treasury, courts still have various ways to reserve 
a portion of filing fees for their own use.115 Therefore, courts have no financial incentive 
to take mass tort cases.116   
In refusing mass tort cases, courts can exploit multiple loopholes in the civil procedure law. 
Upon receiving a complaint, courts can remain silent without giving an official rejection 
order,117  and essentially refuse to hear the case. In addition, courts sometimes even refuse 
to issue receipts for evidence presented to the court,118 despite the requirement that they do 
so.119 This may be due to the fear that the plaintiffs will use the receipts as evidence to hold 
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the court accountable. Perhaps due to these vagaries, studies have shown that less than one 
percent of all environmental cases in China are resolved through the court systems.120  
 
Such practice would not be necessarily illegal as the procedure law provides the courts 
with broad discretion to deny claims. According to Articles 119 and 123 of the Civil 
Procedure Law of China, courts should accept a case when the plaintiff alleges “specific 
claims, facts, and reasons.”121 Many courts have interpreted this as requiring plaintiffs to 
produce substantial evidence of a claim before the court decides whether to accept the case 
for review.122 Thus, plaintiffs must produce persuasive evidence of their claim to convince 
the court to hear the case.123 Some courts have even required that plaintiffs demonstrate a 
causal link in the evidence before they will accept a case.124 The following event 
demonstrates how the local government relied on the socialized liability principle to 
sidestep the court system and forced the victims to accept inadequate compensations.    
 
A. STUDENTS KILLED IN THE SICHUAN EARTH QUAKE  
 
On May 12, 2008, a 7.9 magnitude earthquake in Sichuan Province caused 68,712 deaths, 
with an estimated 18,000 missing, most of whom were presumed dead.125 In some areas, 
only school buildings suffered total damage while other buildings survived, which led the 
public to suspect shoddy construction and corruption.126 Since the earthquake occurred in 
the afternoon during regular school session, students did not have a chance to escape the 
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buildings. In a high school in Juyuan, for example, more than 270 students died.127 The 
Beichuan Middle School building, moreover, was reduced to rubble in just 5 seconds.128 
According to a report released by the Sichuan Education Bureau, the earthquake destroyed 
7,000 school classrooms, killing between 5,000129 to 10,000 schoolchildren.130   It remains 
unknown how many schoolchildren were severely injured or disabled. As a result of the 
one-child policy at the time,131 most of the school children who died or were injured were 
the only child in their family, which exacerbated the pain and suffering of their parents.132  
 
The shoddy construction was plainly evident as untrained eyes could find irregularities. 
Parents and rescuers reported that the steel rods found in the broken concrete slabs were 
no thicker than a ballpoint pen.133 The twisted steel rods from the debris were so weak that 
an artist straightened them with his bare hands.134 Experts from the United States and China 
agreed that the buildings could have withstood the earthquake if proper steel and concrete 
materials had been used during their construction.135 The China Daily, a government 
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newspaper, stated, “We cannot afford not to raise uneasy questions about the structural 
quality of school buildings.”136  
 
Tort litigation would have shed light on whether the earthquake, the construction defects, 
or a combination of the two, caused the collapse of the school buildings. The construction 
firms would have had opportunities to defend themselves if they could show they exercised 
reasonable care in selecting construction materials and complying with the building code. 
If the construction defects indeed were the cause of the destruction of the school buildings, 
the parents would justifiably hold the negligent builders liable and put the public on notice 
of the builder’s tortious conduct to prevent future harm. If litigation uncovered illegal acts, 
such as corruption, concerned parties including the builders would have been subject to 
criminal prosecution. Tort lawsuits would have provided an opportunity for both parties to 
seek justice.  
 
It seems that tort litigation is complementary to the government’s efforts to resolve disputes 
and maintain social stability. The parents, however, did not even have a chance to protest 
near the court house. An armed anti-riot police squad forcefully dispersed a protest 
organized by about 100 parents, who held their deceased children’s pictures in front of the 
court building.137 In a separate incident in 2009, the police detained an eight-year-old boy 
along with his father overnight in prison in order to locate the boy’s uncle who had plan to 
petition the government for the death of his children in the earthquake.138  
 
Despite pledging to investigate the collapsed buildings, the local government ended the 
investigation hastily by concluding that the earthquake was the sole cause of the collapse 
of the school buildings.139 The government may have feared that a thorough investigation 
would have unearthed corruption or other illegal acts, causing even more public resentment 
and ultimately threatening social stability. To prevent any further investigation, the 
government cordoned off140  and “bulldozed the remains of many schools” only a month 
after the earthquake.141  Subsequently, the central government issued a report attributing 
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the deaths and injuries of school children to shoddy construction, but it did not serve as a 
legal basis for parents to sue because the restrictions on civil litigation were still in place.  
 
By circumventing the court proceedings, the government forced the parents to accept a 
comprehensive package, which paid $8,800 for the death of a child and $5,600 per parent 
for a pension.142 The pension payment was intended to replace the benefits that the parents 
would have received after retirement if their children lived to adulthood.143 The parents 
were initially not willing to accept the payment because it was too low. Once the parents 
accepted the compensation, they had to sign a contract promising not to protest against the 
government about the schools that collapsed. Instead of admitting responsibility for 
mismanagement, the contract portrayed the payment as a social benefit that the government 
granted to the parents. To receive the “benefit,” the parent had to agree, “From now on, 
under the leadership of the party and the government, we will obey the law and maintain 
social order……We vow resolutely not to take part in any activity that disturbs post-




Through the lens of the socialized liability principle, the analysis of leading case sheds 
light on the various unique features of the TLL. Socialized liability allows Chinese courts 
to hold a party who is not at fault liable for victim’s injuries. Conversely, it also permits 
courts to deny claims against a party who is at fault in mass tort cases in the name of 
maintaining social stability. Despite its elusiveness, socialized liability serves a vital 
purpose as it ensures that the injured victim will receive compensation in non-class action 
litigation regardless of whether the defendants are at fault in traditional negligence terms. 
Otherwise, the government fears that uncompensated victims may resort to undesirable 
dispute-resolution channels, such as openly petitioning the government, protesting in front 
of government buildings, posting embarrassing exposés online, or venting anger through 
acts that threaten public safety, all of which could undermine social stability.145  
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parents. 
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145 The Party and the government attaches great importance to maintaining social stability, which 
overrides any other interests including the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. On Feb. 7, 
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实〈保护司法人员依法履行法定职责规定〉的实施办法》的通知) (Article 11 of the Notice 
prohibits protests in the adjacent area of the court buildings in the forms of siting out, blocking 
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the notice range from administrative actions to criminal penalty.) 






In cases of mass torts, however, the government fears that victims suffering similar injuries 
could form an influential group and collectively fight in court against tortious SOEs as well 
as private companies possibly backed by the government for corrective reasons. Inquiries 
into fault could expose problems of mismanagement and corruption, attracting unnecessary 
attention and arousing public resentment. The advent of social media, albeit tightly 
censored in China, makes it difficult for the government to block information. The strategy 
for the government, therefore, is preemptively to prevent victims from congregating online 
or on the streets by compelling them to accept government-determined compensation, 
although grossly inadequate in monetary terms, and to promise not to pursue further 
litigation. The government then directs courts not to take their claims, bars lawyers from 
litigating mass tort cases, and invokes criminal laws to punish disgruntled agitators. The 
government takes all these measures in the name of maintaining social stability, the 
cornerstone of the dubious legal concept of socialized liability.  
 
Scholars often refer to Article 24 as an example of equitable liability, which is clearly a 
misnomer as it is certainly inequitable to hold a party not at fault liable in cases where there 
is no justification for imposing strict liability. Yet, scholars are correct that there is a 
“benefit” created by compelling a non-fault party to pay or by shielding a party who is at 
fault from litigation. But they have missed the crucial question of where the “benefit” goes. 
The analysis based on socialized liability principle reveals that the “benefit” goes to the 
state, which fails to provide a social safety net. In this sense, courts have become a tool for 
the government to redistribute wealth, compensate the victims, and maintain social 
stability. The concerns about social stability and state interests take precedence over any 
analysis of fault in non-strict liability cases. Even though socialized liability defies the 
traditional notion of justice, it remains a pragmatic tool in the TLL precisely because of its 
flexible, adaptive, and ambiguous nature.     
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